

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 H-01

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 ERDA-05 OIC-02 OMB-01 TRSE-00

COME-00 EB-07 FEA-01 NRC-05 OES-07 CU-02 DHA-02

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9590

DIA WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMCONSUL MUNICH

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION GENEVA

MBFR VIENNA 899

USMISSION USUN

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 9817

USSALTTWO

ATTN DIA: SEE PARA 6 FOR IR DATE

BELGRADE ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: A. MOSCOW 9652 B. MOSCOW 9499

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E. O. 11652: GDS (83)

TAGS: MPOL, SALT, SOPN, UR, US

SUBJECT: IZVESTIA POLITICAL COMMENTATOR ON CRUISE MISSILES

AND SALT

SUMMARY: IZVESTIA SENIOR COMMENTATOR V. MATVEYV WRITES ON 6 JULY THAT

THE US B-1/CRUISE MISSILE DECISION RAISES THE PROSPECT OF THOUSANDS OF STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES (CMS) AND SERIOUSLY COMPLICATES THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS. MATVEYEV GOES TO SOME LENGTH TO REBUT SECDEFBROWN'S 3 JULY STATEMENT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PREVIOUS SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING ON CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATIONS. INSTEAD, HE CLAIMS SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WAS ACHIEVED AND CLARIFIED IN SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 1974-76 WHICH PROVIDED THAT HEAVY BOMBERS ARMED WITH ALCM'S WITH RANGES OVER 600KM WOULD BE IN THE MIRV SUBCEILING. HE ALSO STATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO SEEK FULL PROHIBITION OF GROUND OR SEA-BASED CMS WITH RANGES OVER 600KM. MATVEYEV ACCUSES THE US OF TRYING TO REFUTE AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY MEASURES ALREADY UNDERTAKEN WHICH INTENSIFY THE ARMS RACE AND NOTES BREZHNEV'S HAVING POINTED OUT ELEMENTS OF UNCONSTRUCTIVE US BEHAVIOR IN HIS 5 JULY MEETING WITH AMB TOON. OTHER SOVIET PRESS REPORTS THIS WEEK HAVE CONTINUED SOVIET CRITICISM OF THE B-1 DECISION BY CHARACTERIZING IT AS A GO-AHEAD FOR THE MORE DANGEROUS CMS, COMPLICATING THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS, AND PART OF A LARGER US EFFORT TO ACCELERATE THE ARMS RACE. END SUMMARY.

1. THE 6 JULY IZVESTIA CARRIES A COMMENTARY IN BOLD-FACED TYPE BY V. MATVEYEV WHICH CONTINUES SOVIET CRITICISM OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S RECENT B-1/CRUISE MISSILE DECISION. MATVEYEV EMPHASIZES THE DANGER PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO PROCEED WITH AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT EVEN MENTIONING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENTIAL

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DECISION TO FOREGO SERIES PRODUCTION OF THE B-1; INSTEAD MATVEYEV RAISES THE SPECTER OF "THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS OF CRUISE MISSILES" AS A NEW, FOURTH COMPONENT OF THE US STRATEGIC ARSENAL.

2. THE COMMENTARY GOES TO SOME LENGTH TO REBUT SEC DEF BROWN'S STATEMENT AT HIS 3 JULY PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PREVIOUS US-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON LIMITING CMS. ON THE CONTRARY, MATVEYEV ASSERTS, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO IMPOSE STRICT LIMITATIONS ON CMS (PRESUMABLY AT VLADIVOSTOK) AND THEN DISCUSSED AND CLARIFIED THE VARIANTS OF THESE LIMITATIONS IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN 1975-76. HE CLAIMS THAT A "FORMULA WAS AGREED", ACCORDING TO WHICH ANY HEAVY BOMBER CARRYING CMS WITH RANGE GREATER THAN 600 KM WOULD BE COUNTED IN THE LIMIT IMPOSED ON MIRVED ICBMS. REGARDING GROUND AND SEA-BASED CMS, MATVEYEV NOTES THAT THE SOVIET UNION "HAS PROPOSED AND PROPOSES THAT SUCH CMS WITH RANGE GREATER THAN 600KM SHOULD BE PROHIBITED IN GENERAL". NOW, HE STATES, IN WASHINGTON "THEY ARE TRYING TO REJECT THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS" IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY MEASURES ALREADY UNDERTAKEN TO PUSH AHEAD THE ARMS RACE. THUS THE US IS ACCUSED OF CASTING ASIDE AGREED POSITIONS AFTER, ACCORDING TO A RECENT STATEMENT OF FORMER PRESIDENT FORD, A SALT II AGREEMENT HAD BEEN 95 PJ

RCENT
ACHIEVED.

3. THE MATVEYEV ARTICLE CLOSES BY NOTING THAT POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS OVER THE PAST YEARS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED
ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY, MUTUAL ADVANTAGE AND NONINTERFERENCE
IN ONE ANOTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, IT STATES AT PRESENT
US POLICY INCLUDES A SERIES OF UNCONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS WHICH WERE
POINTED OUT TO US AMBASSADOR TOON BY CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV ON 5
JULY.

4. THIS WEEK HAS ALSO SEEN OTHER SOVIET PRESS REACTION TO THE B-1/
CRUISE MISSILE DECISION. ON 6 JULY KZ CARRIED A TASS ITEM FROM
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WASHINGTON WHICH REPEATED THE STANDARD THEMES SOUNDED EARLIER
(SEE REF TELS) ABOUT THE IMPENDING CM DEPLOYMENT UNDERMINING
VLADIVOSTOK, INTERFERING IN THE CONCLUSION OF SALT, AND BEING PART
OF A LARGER US EFFORT (MX, MK 12A, NEUTRON BOMBS, NEW ASW
PROGRAMS) WHICH INTENSIFY THE ARMS RACE. IZVESTIA CORRESPONDENT
V. KOBYSH WROTE MANY OF THESE SAME CRITICISMS FROM WASHINGTON ON
5 JULY AND ADDED THAT THE B-1 DECISION WILL NOT HALT CONTINUED
TESTING OF THE B-1 PROTOTYPES AND THAT SECDEF BROWN HAD
CHARACTERIZED CMS AS MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS THAN THE B-1.

5. COMMENT: MATVEYEV'S ARTICLE REPRESENTS A PUBLIC RESTATEMENT OF THE

SOVIET SALT II POSITIONS REGARDING CMS. IT REITERATES BOTH THEIR
INSISTENCE THAT VLADIVOSTOK AND SUBSEQUENT US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN
1975-76 HAD ACHIEVED AGREEMENT ON HANDLING ALCMS AND THEIR CALL FOR
PROHIBITION OF GROUND AND SEA-BASED CMS WITH RANGES GREATER THAN
600KM. THUS WHILE APPARENTLY ALARMED AT THE US COMMITMENT TO DEPLOY
ALCMS EMBODIED IN THE PRESIDENT'S B-1 DECISION, THE SOVIETS ARE
MAINTAINING THEIR WELL-ESTABLISHED SALT II NEGOTIATING POSITION IN
AN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE AN INDIRECT LIMIT ON THE NUMBERS OF
ALCMS THE US WILL DEPLOY AND TO PROHIBIT COMPLETELY STRATEGIC
GLCMS AND SLCMS.

6. IR DATEA: 1. USSR (UR) 2. 6 901 0670 77, 3. IZVESTIA POLITICAL
COMMENTATOR ON CRUISE MISSILES AND SALT (U) 4. 5. 770706 6. 770707
7. 770707, MOSCOW USSR, 8. CIR: 1C5A9000/CONTINUES, 9. :-3
10. USDAO MOSCOW USSR (AIRA) 11. NO 12. EDWARD L. WARNER, MAJ, USAF,
AAIRA, 13. JAMES W WOLD, BRIG GEN, USAF, DEFENSE ATTACHE,
14. IZVESTIA, RED STAR, USSR, 15. NON-DIRC
GDS 31 DEC 83
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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
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Concepts: PRESS COMMENTS, SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, MISSILES
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Copy: SINGLE
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Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
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Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/06b58a6e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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